“To jaw-jaw is always better than to war-war.”

– Winston Churchill, at a White House luncheon hosted by President Eisenhower, June 26, 1954

Tensions mount between Iran and a good chunk of the world, most notably the United States and Europe. Terroristic attacks and sectarian violence escalate in both Iraq and Afghanistan. The carnage in Syria continues unabated even with the ineffectual presence of “monitors” from the Arab League, one of whom resigned, calling the mission a “farce.”

Contrast these war clouds with contradictory signs of movement towards dialogue if not outright peace:

• In Amman, Jordan, King Abdullah II hosted the first face-to-face meeting between official Israeli and Palestinian negotiators in over a year. While there were no breakthroughs, it is encouraging that the two sides are willing to keep open the door to resumed peace talks.

• The Taliban, with the reluctant endorsement of Afghan President Hamid Karzai, has opened up an office in the Persian Gulf state of Qatar, and there are strong indications that some kind of peace negotiations with the United States and its NATO allies might be possible.

• In the aftermath of first-round elections in post-Mubarak Egypt, in which the Muslim Brotherhood was about 40 percent of the vote (while the even more radical Islamist Salafi group won about 30 percent), the U.S. has begun high level talks with leaders of the plurality party, according to a recent New York Times story.

It is quite legitimate to view the above-mentioned diplomatic contacts with a strong degree of skepticism. Why should we think Abdullah’s efforts will pass muster when neither the U.S. nor other members of the so-called Quartet-the United Nations, European Union and Russia-have been able to effect constructive change?

How can we possibly trust a group like the Taliban, which hosted Osama bin Laden and Al Qaeda in the lead-up to the 9/11 attacks, which in turn led to the U.S.-led NATO military campaign which ousted the Taliban from power?

Similarly, one could also ask if it makes any sense for the U.S. to engage discussion with the Muslim Brotherhood, a radical Islamist group founded in 1928 of which Hamas is an official branch. Its leadership has given mixed signals as to whether it would honor the Egypt-Israel peace treaty. Since the ouster of Mubarak, relations between Egypt and Israel have deteriorated, with nine attacks on the natural gas pipeline in the Sinai, which had been available to Israel under terms of the treaty.

On balance, though, we still believe it makes sense for the U.S. and others to choose diplomacy where even a shred of optimism exists. So in the above examples, it would be wise to at least explore the possibility that there might be “moderate” factions among the Taliban and Muslim Brotherhood as some foreign policy voices have suggested for the past couple of years.

Just as with Israeli negotiations with Palestinian leaders, however, talks with both the Taliban and the Muslim Brotherhood must be based on some bedrock principles:

• The Taliban must agree to become a normative political party or faction in Afghanistan and to renounce terrorism, violence and its persecution of women. The Taliban must also agree to respect all treaties and international agreements regarding the future of Afghanistan as an inclusive and democratic state.

• The U.S. must insist that the Muslim Brotherhood officially and explicitly agree to honor, and not abrogate or scuttle the Egypt-Israel peace treaty, to rein in its Hamas faction in Gaza and to renounce its hateful rhetoric against the State of Israel and the Jewish people.

In October 1962, during the Cuban Missile Crisis, the world came very close to a cataclysmic nuclear exchange which could have caused millions of deaths in the United States, the Soviet Union and all over the world.

Through patient and brilliant talks with Andrei Gromyko, the Soviet Foreign Minister, Attorney General Robert Kennedy was able to come up with a face-saving agreement which resulted in the Soviet withdrawal of its missiles from Cuba. In that historic instance, in which the superpowers came perilously close to mutually assured destruction, it was far better to “jaw-jaw than to war-war.”

Talk is not in and of itself appeasement, as Churchill of all people was aware. If the Taliban and Muslim Brotherhood, whose records do not engender much confidence or trust, are open to talks with the U.S. and others, that alone is sufficient to enter into exploratory negotiations with a realistic assessment of their intentions. Talk based on frank exchanges and explicit goals, rather than on wishful thinking and naive assumptions, is worthy of cautious exploration. We have very little to lose by giving it a try.